ABSTRACT The Internet is an unsecured public network accessed by approximately half of the world population. There are several techniques, such as cryptography, end-to-end encryption, and tunneling, used to preserve data security and integrity and to reduce information theft. This is because the security of data transmission over public networks is an ever-questionable issue. However, none of the above techniques are capable of providing the flexibility of changing either the algorithm or its key at the intermediary routers according to the requirements of stakeholders, e.g., ISPs or Internet users. Although the transmitted data are encrypted and unreadable, the metadata contained in the packet headers are readable during traversal. Nonetheless, service-based Internet architectures, e.g., IoT architectures, demand the analysis the data streams at the intermediary routers to provide smart services such as strengthening the security of the data streams. To this end, this paper proposes a method to use service-oriented routers for providing secure data transmission by encrypting data packets including the header and trailer information. A prototype of the proposed method is implemented on the ns-3 simulator, and this paper discusses the implementation notes and evaluation of the test results. The test results demonstrate that there is only an average processing cost of 180.14/191.35, 213.96/257.41, 157.56/170.68, and 235.48/249.49 µs for encrypting the total encrypted combined packets/total encrypted separate packets using IDEA, DES, AES-GCM, and AES-CTR encryption algorithms, respectively, with a 256-bit key space. This is significantly lower than the tolerable transmission delay (150 ms) defined by the ITU-T.
are well-known, and used to provide data security over the TCP/IP protocol suite. They are famously known as end-to-end data encryption (E2EE) methods.
E2EE methods ensure only end-to-end data security, and such methods in some circumstances have no consideration about the security of the metadata used for the communication such as packet header information. More importantly, such methods have no consideration about the data routing paths [18] . Here, the underlying routing can have secure methods such as neighbor authentication, route filtering, and BGP TTL security check. However, the E2EE methods cannot guarantee the routing paths to contain such methods because such methods exist in the lower layers.
Moreover, in the E2EE methods except tunneling methods such as IPSec and MACsec, the transmitted routing information: headers and trailers are not protected because they are unencrypted [19] , [20] . The sensitive information in the IP headers such as source and destination IP addresses can be used to identify the communication parties. Therefore, sensitive information in headers and trailers is vulnerable to events such as information theft using deep packet inspection (DPI) attacks, or side channel attacks to the physical links.
On the contrary, tunneling encryption protocols are totally independent of the routing flow; when data is encrypted or obscured by tunneling, it impedes analysis of traffic streams, which is the vital feature for the servicebased future Internet [20] . E2EE methods do not allow the network routers to set encryption algorithm or the key details in-between the transmission hops; therefore, even some of the unsecured links between the communication paths can cause security breaches with the selected encryption algorithm and key spaces [21] .
The network router is the building block of the Internet because routers connect the networks that compose the Internet [22] . Essentially, data travels through network routers; the routers are also used to provide network functions such as firewalls and intruder detection and prevention systems [22] . To this end, we argue that the network router is a vital device that can be used to preserve data security and privacy during data routing through the Internet. The networks use specific devices such as unified threat management (UTM), firewall systems, and DMZs to detect malicious communication. However, the regular routers currently do not possess the capability of providing adequate data security ensuring CIA. With the emerging technological trend of using network routers to provide user services, Service-oriented Router (SoR), which is a next-generation backbone router, has been proposed by our research team [23] [24] [25] [26] to provide end-user services from a router providing CIA to the communication.
Projecting the abovementioned trends, this study proposes a novel method of encrypting data packets including the headers and trailer information (hereafter referred as entire-packet encryption) using Service-oriented Routers (SoRs). The proposed method is an upgraded version of a former study:
per-hop data encryption [27] and DPI, which strengthen the entire-packet encryption service.
The main contribution of this study is to introduce a novel per-hop based entire-packet encryption service allowing users to perform encryption initializing from their end to their edge network SoR mitigating the exit node vulnerability. Moreover, the proposed method provides flexibility to change the key spaces together with the encryption algorithms between hops via per-hop data encryption [27] , thereby admitting different security policies and requirements over public networks in different countries. In general, the contributions of this study can be listed as follows: (1) provide per-hop data encryption, (2) provide data CIA preserving method for application to application communication, and (3) provide flexible link state mechanism to route packets.
II. METHODOLOGY
The proposed entire-encryption service is supported by three main underlying sub-implementations: 1) a link-state routing protocol, 2) a per-hop data encryption service, and 3) a certification authority (CA) architecture.
A. LINK STATE ROUTING PROTOCOL
Initially, a link state-based routing protocol was implemented in the network simulator 3 (ns-3) [28] . The routing protocol was implemented using an extended Dijkstra's algorithm [29] . The routing protocol performs all the functions such as neighbor management, route management, and packet routing, similar to conventional link state routing protocols [30] . In this study, the proposed method was simulated and evaluated only in the IPv4 infrastructure.
B. PER-HOP DATA ENCRYPTION
The routing protocol was extended with a security service: the per-hop data-encryption service [27] . This service encrypts and decrypts data on a per-hop basis. Consequently, it allows several encryption algorithms to be used together with different key sizes along the hops in a communication path.
It is a well-known fact that security policies and requirements differ according to country, organization etc. There are strict constraints regarding the key spaces and encryption algorithms to be used across public networks among countries [31] . Existing end-to-end encryption methods are unable to address these issues because they initiate encryption at the end nodes. However, the proposed per-hop data encryption protocol can tolerate such enforced security policies via dynamically changing the encryption algorithms and key spaces between the hops according to the security policies among the links [27] .
C. SERVICE-ORIENTED ROUTER
Conventional routers are unable to provide extended services to internet users and applications. To address this need, our laboratory has introduced Service-oriented Router (SoR). SoR is middleware that can be implemented on a Cisco [26] . Lately, Cisco, Juniper, and NII also provided such routers by understanding the potential of the routers for the service-based future Internet. In this study, we simulated and tested the proposed services on SoRs.
D. CA ARCHITECTURE
The proposed services use the CA architecture to represent and verify their authentic online identity. CA architecture manages and handles all security aspects of the services provided by the SoRs. Here, all SoRs in a topology were preconfigured with CA details. They create unique public and private-key pairs for all their interfaces during the initialization process. For this purpose, SoRs use the Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (RSA) crypto system to create the public and private-key pairs with a 2,048-bit key space. After generating the key pairs, SoRs send all the interfacing public keys to the CA node. Moreover, all the generated interface encryption keys are stored and managed by the SoRs.
If the PKI key exchange packets are received or sniffed by any person or device other than the destined receiver, e.g., an attacker or intermediate listener, the latter would be unable to read or decrypt the original symmetric-encryption key packets because they do not have the PKI private keys to decrypt the received key packets. Consequently, only the neighbor SoR interface would be able to decrypt and acquire the symmetric-encryption keys using the corresponding RSA-based interface private keys. This process guarantees secure shared key exchange process among the SoRs. Users can use their own CA architecture or an existing internet key exchange (IKE) protocol [32] , [33] to manage the secure key distribution of the proposed method.
E. ENTIRE-PACKET ENCRYPTION SERVICE IMPLEMENTATION
As illustrated in Fig. 1 , adjacent SoRs generate and share the link encryption keys using the CA architecture. On receiving an entire-encrypted packet, the SoR decrypts the packet headers using an appropriate link encryption key, and obtains the original header sensitive details such as the ports, and source and destination IP addresses. It then uses those details to search the next-hop SoR and the particular link encryptionkey. Using the retrieved information, the SoR encrypts the data and original header portions.
After completing the encryption process, the SoR alters the IP header of the packet. This is the most important step of the proposed service, where it secures the original IP header details such as the sender and receiver, and still, allows the packet to be IP routable. The SoR replaces the IP header's sender and receiver details of the received packet with the current SoR forwarding-interface IP address and the next-hop SoR IP address, respectively. This process allows the packet to be IP routable to any intermediate device between the current and the next-hop SoRs.
The packet-decryption key is only known to the current and the next-hop SoRs; therefore, the original IP header details are only readable by these two devices. Consequently, the only IP header details that an intermediate device or packet sniffer can read from a packet is that it is transmitting from the current to the next-hop SoR.
As illustrated in Fig. 2 , the proposed entire-packet encryption service uses its own header structure to transmit the encrypted packets. Fig. 2(a) shows the header-encapsulation structure used by the proposed entire-encryption service. The entire-encrypted packet is transmitted encapsulated in its own basic header structure ( Fig. 2(b) ). Finally, it is encapsulated in the IP header, thereby enabling it to be IP routable.
Initially, the proposed entire-packet encryption service uses four encryption-header types as illustrated in Figs. 2(c), (d), (e), and (f). All the packet types transmitted by the underlying per-hop encryption protocol are attached with the basic packet header. As shown in Fig. 2(b) , the Packet Type field defines the type of the current packet such as entire-encrypted combined packet or separate entireencrypted packet. The Packet Size field is used to identify the transmitted packet size. The Sequence Number field is used to identify the sequence of the packets. This field is mainly used by the underlying routing protocol during the routing-table generation phase to check consistency of the route-update packets. Moreover, this value is used to provide anti-replay protection to the packets transmitted by the proposed service. Finally, the checksum value is used to check basic integrity of the data and identify if the packet is erroneous.
The implemented secure architecture uses the randomnumber generation algorithms available in the Crypto++ library [34] to generate the required unique random numbers. However, users can also use the rand() function in C++ instead of the random-number generation functions available in the Crypto++ library. The proposed service uses the system time value during encryption as the distinctive value.
As an additional counter value is required for each encryption in the AES-CTR mode, it is mandatory to use a fast and secure method to share the same counter value for each packet between the communication parties. The proposed service attaches the counter value to the packet and sends it using the AES-CTR header structures illustrated in Figs. 2(e) and (f).
As the encryption key is shared using PKI and is only known to the communication parties, exposing the counter value does not cause any type of security breach. However, while the packet is in transmission through public networks, attackers or intruders can easily alter the counter value. Therefore, an appropriate integrity checking technique must be used for verification.
The proposed service uses hash-based message authentication code-secure hash algorithm (HMAC-SHA) to authenticate the counter value. As shown in Figs. 2(e) and (f), the packet header is attached with the calculated HMAC-SHA value. This value is calculated for the appended counter value using the encryption key (only known to the communicating parties); this allows the communicating parties to identify any modifications to the counter value.
The HMAC-SHA Hash Value field contains the hashbased message authentication code for the counter value of the current packet. Generally, the Encrypted Header Size/Encrypted Payload Size fields contain the size of the encrypted header/payload values, respectively. Moreover, the Encrypted Header Data field contains the encrypted headers and the Encrypted Payload/Entire-Encrypted Payload fields contain the encrypted payloads.
Headers in Figs. 2(c) and (e) are used to encrypt the payload and header data as a single field, whereas those in Figs. 2(d) and (f) are used to encrypt the headers and data. The IP header's sensitive data is concatenated and encrypted as a single string value inside the Entire-Encrypted Payload field or together with the data inside the Encrypted Header Data, depending on the entire-encryption packet type.
III. TOPOLOGY IMPLEMENTATION AND SIMULATION
The proposed entire-encryption service was simulated using an internet service provider (ISP) topology (AS3967), as illustrated in Fig. 3(a) . The topology contains 79 nodes, which were generated using the Rocketfuel ISP topologymapping engine [35] [36] [37] . The test-bed network comprised a client, content server, CA server, 79 SoRs, and 294 links among the SoRs. All links in the topology were configured with 1 Gbps bandwidth and 2 ms delay.
The simulation was executed on a machine with an Intel Core i7 3.2 GHz CPU, 24 GB RAM, 2 TB hard disk, and CentOS 6.7 64-bit operating system. The proposed encryption service was implemented in the renowned network simulator 3 (ns-3) [28] . In the implementation, IDEA, DES, and AES encryption types AES-GCM and AES-CTR were used as the encryption algorithms with 128-and 256-bit key lengths. During testing, we obtained the total processing time consumed by the processor in microseconds while executing particular functions, using the real-time stamp counter of the CPU.
As illustrated in Fig. 3(a) , the client was programmed to transmit encrypted packet types destined to the server, predominantly in the following two scenarios:
1. Entire-encrypted packets (header + payload as a unit) 2. Separately entire-encrypted packets (header and payload separately)
In each scenario, three sub-scenarios were executed for each encryption method and configured to use three different test cases as mentioned below.
1. Measuring the average processing time (APT) for AES-GCM vs. AES-CTR encryption algorithms.
2. Measuring the APT for IDEA, DES, AES-GCM, and AES-CTR while increasing the packets per second (pps). 3. Measuring the throughput vs. APT for AES-GCM and AES-CTR encryption modes.
In the first test case, we measured the processing time of each SoR for 20 test cases, moving from 5,000 packets to 100,000 packets with a packet gap of 5,000 packets. Processing time was measured for tasks such as decryption and encryption during per-hop data encryption, serializing packet headers, de-serializing packet headers, and selecting routes.
For the initial evaluation, the client was programmed to transmit two types of packets to the server in the topology shown in Fig. 3(a) . First, it transmitted entire-encrypted combined packets, which encrypted the header details together with the payload details. Secondly, it was programmed to transmit separate entire-encrypted packets to the server, where the payload information and the header information were separately encrypted using two fields. The test cases were performed using 128-bit and 256-bit key spaces.
In all the cases, the client was started five seconds after the simulation began. It was programmed to transmit a fixed number of packets at intervals of 0.02 s. The first five seconds were allocated to initializing, generating, and exchanging the PKI and AES keys; updating the key values in the routing tables; and propagating the routing tables of the underlying routing protocol. These processes were automatically executed by the underlying routing protocol regardless of the network topology or number of SoRs in any attached topology.
The APT consumptions were measured, and the results were plotted using graphs as illustrated in Fig. 4 . The test results are summarized in Table 1 .
Further, the simulation was programmed to transmit the same two types of entire-encryption packets using different pps values. For this test case, the APTs for IDEA, DES, AES-GCM, and AES-CTR encryption algorithms were measured while increasing the pps 10 times in each case; starting with a value of 10 pps and ending with 1,000,000 using a 256-bit key space. The main objective of this test case was to measure APT of the proposed entire-packet encryption service for high-speed packet transmission and throughput during the packet transmission. The test results obtained for the APT values vs. the pps for the entire-encrypted combined packets are plotted in the graph shown in Fig. 5(a) . Furthermore, the test results for the separate entire-encrypted packets are plotted in Fig. 5(b) . For the next test case, the APT for different throughputs was measured between each SoR in the packet-propagation path for each encryption algorithm. The test results for the AES-CTR encryption algorithm with a 256-bit key space are plotted in the graph illustrated in Fig. 6 . The measured test results for the entire-encrypted combined packets are shown in Fig. 6(a) , and the results for the separate entire-encrypted packets are plotted in Fig. 6(b) . Both the above test results are summarized in Table 2 .
The throughput values for the two cases vary because the header sizes are different for separate entire-encrypted packets and entire-encrypted combined packets. Generally, according to Figs. 2(e) and (f), the header size is smaller when the header and payload data are encrypted in the same combined header structure than when encrypting the data and packet header separately.
Further, we measured the processing cost for the routecalculation process without any encryption to measure the pure processing cost for packet routing. The test results are summarized in Table 3 . According to the test results for the given topology, the average processing cost for packet routing was 74.11 µs. Therefore, all the above results include 74.11 µs of routing cost, which is consumed by the underlying routing protocol.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In the graphs illustrated in Figs. 6(a) and (b) regarding test case 3, only the AES-CTR encryption mode results were plotted to reduce the large number of graphs. The complete test results for all the encryption algorithms: IDEA, DES, and AES-GCM are summarized in Table 2 . The differences and percentage increments of the entire-packet encryption service versus plain packet routing are compared in Table 3 . The test results in Tables 2 and 3 were measured with a 256-bit key space for all the encryption algorithms. According to Table 2 , encryption data lengths vary according to the encryption algorithm; therefore, throughput values for a constant pps value also change according to the encryption algorithm. Furthermore, the average processing time for the entire-encrypted combined packets is lower than that for the separate entire-encrypted packets because separate entire-encrypted packets must perform the encryption and decryption processes twice separately for the data and header. However, any of the two encryption methods can be selected and used depending on the user or application requirements.
Additionally, the proposed separate entire-encrypted header structures (Figs. 3(d) and (f)) can also be used in a scenario where the payload is end-to-end encrypted and the header is encrypted with per-hop data encryption to reduce the total encryption and decryption delays. The proposed perhop data-encryption service is highly flexible and can be used with any of the above-mentioned combinations among links according to the user, application, or service requirements.
The proposed service displayed average APT of 141.8 and 141.92 µs for AES-GCM mode, and 154.56 and 154.29 µs for AES-CTR mode of packet-propagation delays per hop for 128-bit and 256-bit key lengths, respectively, while transmitting the entire-encrypted combined packets. These processing times increased to 218.94 and 221.39 µs for AES-GCM mode, and 231.3 and 232.2 µs for AES-CTR mode for 128-bit and 256-bit key spaces, respectively, while transmitting separate entire-encrypted packets.
According to the International Telegraph Union Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) recommendation G.114 [38] , if the total transmission delay over networks is maintained at less than 150 ms, most applications will not be affected significantly. In the test results, the highest processing delay of 265 µs (0.265 ms) was caused by the AES-CTR mode while transmitting the separate entireencrypted packets with key space of 256-bit. Therefore, a packet should pass over 566 hops on average, without considering the link delays to generate a delay greater than 150 ms.
Even with the link costs, the encryption delay caused by the proposed method is small and tolerable over public networks because link delays are of the order of milliseconds whereas processing delays of microseconds. Therefore, we conclude that even with the link and other packet-propagation delays, the proposed entire-packet encryption service can provide complete security to the packets and their headers without causing noticeable end-to-end delays over public networks.
Moreover, the existing internet infrastructure does not require a total change to use the proposed method. Adding SoRs to networks according to the network size is sufficient to deploy all the proposed services. Additionally, the proposed service can be provided easily via extending the existing routing protocols. The Linux-based Crypto++ library is used as the cryptographic library for all cryptographic implementations [29] . Therefore, the proposed method operates much more accurately as a real-world implementation. Furthermore, this enables an easier migration of the total infrastructure to the real-world environment.
V. RELATED WORKS AND BACKGROUND STUDY
Onion routing or The onion router (Tor) was introduced where servers that are voluntarily operated to direct internet traffic through a random sequence of nodes to help conceal users' communication with other services on the Internet [39] , [40] . Nowadays, Tor plays a major role in network security by anonymizing users and concealing their identities.
Reed et al. [41] explained anonymous connections and onion routing describing few vulnerabilities of onion routing. According to this study, onion routing provides anonymous connections but not anonymous communication. However, the proposed method provides both via encrypting identification information from the data stream. Moreover, each onion layer comprises dedicated header information, thereby increasing the packet size, whereas the proposed method uses only one IP header irrespective of the number of SoRs which the packet traverse through. Additionally, according to this study, onion routing's overhead is mainly due to public key cryptography, and is incurred while setting up an anonymous connection. According to [41] , onion routing is vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks. The proposed method can encrypt and hide the original packet stream information (such as port numbers and IP address details), thereby mitigating identifying patterns in the data streams.
As per the security according to [42] , Tor encrypts the connection but not the data. It also mentions that the main drawback of Tor is the exit node's vulnerability. Therefore, it is highly advisable not to transmit unencrypted data over the Tor network because the information may be accessible to an intruder while the data is on the last node. However, in the proposed method, the source encrypts the entire packet and then transmits it to the SoR. The last SoR transmits an encrypted packet to the destination node as well (encrypted using the key pair in-between the destination and next hop SoR). Similarly, the exit node vulnerability can be totally mitigated by the proposed method.
According to Raheem A. [43] , solutions similar to onionrouting provide high degree of route un-traceability; however their process introduces considerable delays and inefficiencies in terms of bandwidth and energy utilization. The proposed method does not implement such considerably high delays. Additionally, it can provide secured packet traceability [44] , which can be very useful in situations such as tracking the source of an identified network attack.
The plain headers of the protocols such as IP and TCP cause security vulnerabilities such as TCP sequence number prediction, TCP blind spoofing, SYN flooding, session hijacking, cross-site scripting, man-in-the-middle attacks, and DNS protocol attacks. With diligent application of the right types of algorithms, it is possible for an attacker to guess the sequence of numbers that TCP assigns to a stream of data packets. Knowing the next number in a transmission sequence, an attacker may potentially ''step in'' an ongoing communication and pose as the originator of the message. In TCP blind spoofing, an attacker is able to guess both the sequence number and port number of an ongoing communication session. They are then in a position to execute an injection attack by inserting corrupted or fraudulent data; or malicious code or malware into the stream.
Under the protocol rules, a client or server receiving these requests is required to respond to them to keep the communication alive. This requirement is the basis of a SYN flooding attack, wherein multiple SYN packets are spoofed using a bogus source address, and further sent to a targeted server. These attack types use the TCP/IP header fields to perform the attacks. The proposed method can mitigate such types of attacks by hiding the original TCP/IP header information.
In session hijacking, an attacker may capture data packets and gain full access to an HTTP session using a packet sniffer (a tool for detecting the presence and movement of data packets). If there is weak authentication between a web server and its clients, the attacker may assume full control of the client's rights, switching the communication to one directly between them and the targeted server. However, unlike conventional methods, because the packets transmitted by the proposed method are entirely encrypted, the sniffers will not be able to see or access the original sender and receiver information together with the sensitive information of the TCP header to perform session hijacking attacks.
By spoofing an IP address, an attacker may intercept an ongoing transmission and impersonate the entity (person or a bot) involved in the communication, and steer valuable data toward themselves or misinformation and malware toward the recipient. These types of man-in-the-middle attacks are a common threat over public networks such as the Internet. The proposed method can overcome such an attack by encapsulating sensitive data in the packet headers and trailers together with the packet data. Therefore, although the attackers and sniffers can sniff the data, they cannot analyze or obtain the original/sensitive information regarding the packet streams.
Fundamentally, encryption blinds intrusion detection and prevention systems. However, with the help of per-hop data encryption, SoRs can analyze the authorized encrypted packet streams without disabling encryption over the permitted streams.
VI. CONCLUSION
Preserving CIA during data transmission is essential while communicating through public networks. Conventional methods either lack securing the sensitive details in the packet headers or expose those details at exit points. In this study, we introduced an entire-packet encryption service that employs a per-hop data encryption method to provide a secure packet-encryption service over public networks. It allows users or applications to dynamically select encryption algorithms together with different key spaces between the hops. Generally, it secures the packet payloads together with the IP headers, and still allows the packet to be IP routable.
The main limitation of the model is that there must be SoRs at least at the edge of the networks of the communication parties. Adding more SoRs to the networks provides more security to the communication. The SoR interfaces must also be configured with appropriate key spaces and encryption algorithms according to the security requirements of the connected networks.
The test results demonstrated that the proposed method was flexible to use with encryption algorithms such as IDEA, DES, AES-GCM, and AES-CTR. AES-CTR mode is a proven method to be used with Gbps-rate packet streams while providing authentication to the packets, and can overcome lost or reordered packet scenarios. According to the test results, the proposed entire-packet encryption method causes delays considerably shorter than 150 ms. Therefore, we can conclude that the proposed method can be used for most of the general applications.
In future work, we will test this method in a real-world network with actual traffic and hardware SoRs. The current SoR infrastructure was created by the authors using Intel architecture (IA) and Intel-based libraries such as data-plane development kit (DPDK) [45] . The encryption and decryption delays can be reduced drastically using hardware-based cryptographic acceleration technologies such as Intel Quick Assist [46] , [47] . In future we plan to integrate these technologies into SoRs and measure the extra processing power and memory overhead in the proposed methods extending to the IPv6 infrastructure. HIROAKI NISHI is currently a Professor with the Faculty of Science and Technology, Keio University. He places great importance on considering what is required for the highly networked information society in the future. The main theme of his current research is in building of the total network system including the development of hardware and software architecture. He has expertise in research of the next-generation IP router architecture, data anonymization infrastructure, and smart city/smart community. VOLUME 6, 2018 
